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The efficacy of the law of unjust enrichment in
providing a satisfactory remedy where contracts
are ineffective due to common mistake or error
Kenneth J Arenson
1. Introduction
For decades legal scholars have struggled in an attempt to transform an
amorphous set of rules - commonly known as the law of unjust enrichment -
into a coherent body of law which can be applied with fairness and consistency.
Although some would urge that these efforts have reached fruition, the
discussion to follow will demonstrate that the law of unjust enrichment remains
in its incipient stages of development. In an effort to underscore this point,
special attention will focus on the question of whether the law of unjust
enrichment is presently capable of providing a satisfactory remedy in cases
where contracts are ineffective due to error or mistake. In so doing, the
following discussion will repose substantial reliance upon the work of Peter
B irks,' considered by many as one of the leading authorities in this area.
2. Difficulties in proving enrichment
There are several problematic areas in which it can be argued that the law of
unjust enrichment does not provide an adequate remedy in situations where
contracts are ineffective due to mistakes. The first concerns those cases in
which the plaintiff will be unable to demonstrate that the defendant has been
enriched.2 According to Birks, the plaintiff claiming restitution will typically
be confronted by the argument that the defendant has not been enriched
through the receipt of whatever the plaintiff has given. Invoking what is often
referred to as the doctrine of'subjective devaluation,' the defendant will argue
that whatever costs the plaintiff may have incurred - and whatever the value of
the benefit as viewed from the plaintiffs perspective - the performance has little
or no value from the defendant's perspective. Therefore, the argument follows,
Senior Lecturer in Law, Deakin University.
Birks, P. 1989, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
146 ('Birks').
184 Deakin Law Review
the defendant has not been enriched and an essential element of the cause of
action in restitution is lacking: no recovery should be allowed.3
According to Birks, there are two ways in which a plaintiff may overcome the
doctrine of subjective devaluation. If the defendant has freely accepted a
benefit with knowledge that it was not bestowed gratuitously - and having had
a sufficient opportunity and knowledge of the facts to reject it - he or she is no
longer in a position to argue that the performance is worthless from his is or her
perspective.4 Yet, as we shall see, the notion of free acceptance is not always
a panacea for claims of subjective devaluation.
The other method for successfully overcoming subjective devaluation is what
Birks calls 'incontrovertible benefit.'5 This, according to Birks, occurs where
a performance has been received under such circumstances that no reasonable
person in the defendant's position could discount its value. An 'incontrovertible
benefit' consists of three species. The first, and most obvious, is when the
defendant has received money. As money can easily be transformed into goods
or services of the defendant's choosing, and is the yardstick by which wealth
is normally measured, there is no room for an argument of subjective
devaluation.6 The second species is when the defendant has received something
other than money which has been converted into money. For example, D
receives a bicycle from P and before P seeks restitution, D sells the bicycle for
$200. Although D's original receipt was other than money, it has now been
converted into what Birks calls 'realisation in money.' As noted above, money
is not susceptible to the claim that it is worthless from the defendant's
viewpoint.7 The final species of 'incontrovertible benefit' is what Birks terms
'anticipation of necessary expenditure.'8 When the defendant receives goods
or services which he or she was legally obligated or otherwise practically
certain to procure on his or her own, he or she will not be heard to claim that
what he or she has received was of no value.9 Food, clothing and medical care
are classical examples of'necessary expenditures.'
2 Id at 109-114.
3 Ibid.
4 Id at 266-267.
5 Id at 116-124.
6 Ibid.
7 I d.8 Id at 117.
9 Id at 117-120.
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Returning to the problem of proving an enrichment in contracts rendered
ineffective by mistake, suppose that the defendant has not received an
incontrovertible benefit and the plaintiff must therefore rely on free acceptance
to demonstrate that the defendant has been enriched. Take the example of a
home owner who enters into negotiations to have a swimming pool installed on
his or her land. Unbeknown to both parties, a contract was never formed due
to failure to comply with the technical requirements of offer and acceptance.
When the builder has completed fifty percent of the project, a dispute arises
and the builder claims restitution for his or her part performance. Although
there has been a mistake of fact as to the existence of a contract which appears
to be both causal and fundamental, has there been a free acceptance
constituting an enrichment?
According to Birks, the answer must be that there has not; the basic rationale
being that one does not freely accept parts of an entire performance as they
accrue, nor does one freely accept anything less than all of what he or she has
bargained for. "' Though Birks has suggested that an argument for 'limited
acceptance' may prove helpful in such cases,"' the rather conspicuous absence
of jurisprudence to support such an argument provides little encouragement.
Although the often cited case of Planche v. Colburn12 yielded a result that
might be explained in terms of 'limited acceptance,' the Court's opinion in
Planche is bereft of any such theory. Even Birks suggests that Planche might
better be explained in terms of other policy considerations. In Planche, the
contract in question was discharged by the defendant's wilful breach rather than
a mistake on the part of one or both parties. Birks suggests that the defendant's
status as a breaching party may have inspired the Court to overlook any
difficulties concerning the valuation of the plaintiffs part performance. 3 For
present purposes, however, it appears that a plaintiff in the position of our
builder will be left without an adequate remedy in unjust enrichment.
It should be noted that, in the foregoing example, no contract ever came into
existence. This factor is worthy of comment, for the topic under discussion
refers to contracts which are 'ineffective' due to 'mistake' or 'error.' It is well-
settled that contracts which are ineffective due to common mistake are not
'0 Id at 286-287.
' Id at 232.
12 (1831)8Bing 14.
'" Birks, fn. I at 232.
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merely voidable, they are in fact void.14 Therefore, where restitutionary claims
are predicated on mistake, there should be no practical distinction between void
contracts which have met the formal requirements of offer and acceptance and
negotiations which have not. In any event, the result would be the same in the
former situation; the plaintiff who renders part performance cannot rely on free
acceptance in order to prove an enrichment.
Before leaving the topic of the difficulties in proving an enrichment in certain
cases of mistake, more must be said of Birks' notion that free acceptance can
serve as a basis for enrichment (as well as an 'unjust factor'). Birks' rationale
is best illustrated by his famous window cleaner scenario: a person comes to
your house and begins to clean your windows without having been requested
to do so. You are aware that these services are not being offered gratuitously,
yet you stand idly by, even secrete yourself, in order to take advantage of the
window cleaner's misplaced hope that he will be compensated.' 5 Birks argues
that even though the window cleaner has assumed the risk of his or her own
misprediction, the homeowner has now made himself or herself a party to the
risk by deliberately passing up an opportunity to reject the services. This,
Birks argues, estops the homeowner from asserting that the window cleaner has
assumed the risk of misprediction.16
Aside from the fact that Birks' reasoning flies in the face of the cardinal rule
that one cannot foist an affirmative duty upon another to reject unsolicited
goods or services,'7 such reasoning does not withstand analysis in contractual
situations. For example, in many cases the parties become involved in
"4 Atiyah, P.S. 1989, An Introduction to the Law of Contract, 4th edn, Oxford
University Press, New York, 234-245. For an interesting discussion of the topic of
mistakes and their impact upon the law of unjust enrichment, see Birks, fn. I at
146-173. Birks distinguishes between the mistakes which are induced by fraudulent
misrepresentation and 'spontaneous mistakes' which result from negligent
misrepresentation or no misrepresentation at all. In the former instances, the
contracts are merely voidable rather than void. See generally Calamari, J. & Perillo,
J. 1990, Contracts, 2nd edn, West Publishing Co., St Paul, 299-3 10 ('Calamari').
' Birks, fn. I at 265-266.
16 Id at 266.
17 Mead, G., 'Free Acceptance: Some Further Considerations' (1989) 105 LQR 460;
Calamari, fn. 14 at 64: 'Silence does not give rise to an acceptance of an offer or
counteroffer ... Normally, a party cannot by the wording of his offer turn the
absence of a communication into an acceptance and compel the recipient of his
offer to remain silent at his peril.'
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prolonged negotiations over contractual terms and a contract ultimately results.
In these situations, one would be hard pressed to claim that either party has
assumed the risk of their own misprediction. On the contrary, the parties have
entered into what they consider to be a legally binding contract in order to
ensure performance, or compensation for the lack thereof, by the other party.
Although Birks devotes considerable attention to his theory of free acceptance,
his discussion is conspicuously devoid of authority to support the proposition
that it can be used as either an unjust factor or a basis for enrichment. Birks
argues that notwithstanding this absence of authority, there are innumerable
cases' 8 whose results can only be explained in terms of free acceptance.' 9
Though Birks may be correct, plaintiffs who are forced to rely on free
acceptance in making out a prima facie case in unjust enrichment will face
formidable opposition - even under Birks' best case scenario where there has
been complete performance. In short, the difficulties in demonstrating an
enrichment will, in many cases, prevent the law of unjust enrichment from
affording a satisfactory remedy where contracts are ineffective as a result of
mistake or error.
Mistakes induced by misrepresentation: can rescission solve the
enrichment dilemma?
In contracts which are voidable as a result of misrepresentation, the plaintiff
retains the option of pursuing an in personam claim in restitution for the value
received by the defendant20 subject, of course, to the difficulties that may arise
in proving enrichment. On the other hand, where the mistake is induced by
misrepresentation, the contract is treated as voidable rather than void.2' This
means that the defendant has acquired title which is voidable if the plaintiff
elects to exercise his or her right to rescind the contract.22 The effect of
rescission is to invalidate the contract ab initio and revest in the plaintiff title
18 See, for example, Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) LR I HL 83. But see Angelopoulos
and Sabatino [ 19951 65 SASR I; Brenner v. First Artists' Management Ltd [ 1993]
2 VR 221. These cases, decided subsequent to Birks' 1989 treatise, held that free
acceptance can constitute an enrichment as well as an unjust factor in the law of
unjust enrichment.
19 Birks, fn. I at 277-279.
20 Idat 172-173.
21 ld at 171.
22 ibid.
188 Deakin Law Review
to the res held by the defendant.23 In situations where the plaintiff cannot
prove an enrichment or simply prefers a return of the res, rescission is
indicated. However, as one might expect, there are limitations on the use of
rescission to effect restitutionary claims in rem; namely, the plaintiff must be
able to make counter-restitution and rescission will not be allowed if the rights
of innocent third parties would be prejudiced. 4
With regard to the latter limitation, the sale of the res to an innocent third party
will bar the plaintiff from rescinding.2 5 Since the defendant has only voidable
title and the third party's title necessarily depends on the defendant's title,
allowing the plaintiff to rescind would prejudice the third party by disgorging
him or her of the res and revesting title in the plaintiff.26 Although an
exception is made to allow rescission where the defendant has received money
and transferred it to an innocent third party who gave value in exchange (here,
the third party's receipt is protected from the effects of rescission on the theory
that where only money is involved, even if traceable, the third party's title does
not depend on the defendant's title),27 situations will arise where the
intervention of a third party will deprive the plaintiff of a remedy in unjust
enrichment. Though the plaintiff may have an available remedy in deceit or
negligence, this serves well to illustrate that the law of unjust enrichment has
serious limitations in providing an adequate remedy where contracts are
ineffective due to mistake or error.
The same can be said of the former limitation on the right of rescission - the
requirement that the plaintiff make counter-restitution. When counter-
restitution is made in specie, the plaintiff has satisfied this condition even if the
benefit has declined in value, so long as the depreciation cannot be attributed
to fault on the part of the plaintiff.28 Moreover, unless the plaintiff was at fault,







27 Id at 172-173.
28 Id at 416-417.
29 Ibid.
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But what of the situations where counter-restitution cannot be affected in
specie? In cases where the plaintiff has consumed all or part of what he or she
has received from the defendant, it is apparent that there can only be
counter-restitution in the form of money or some other substitute.3 ° Yet subject
to a few exceptions, the traditional common law approach has been to disallow
counter-restitution in substitute form.3' Although one of these exceptions has
been in granting the remedy of rescission, even here the courts will allow
counter-restitution in the form of a money substitute only if it can be achieved
32in a just and practical manner. As one might expect, the law is quite unsettled
on the question of what is just and practical in any given set of facts. In the
final analysis, the plaintiff will be left without a remedy in rescission in many
situations where he or she cannot effect counter-restitution in specie.
Even where the plaintiff pursues an in personam claim in unjust enrichment,
he will be confronted with the same requirement of making counter-restitution
and all its attendant difficulties.33 Thus, the general reluctance of courts to
place a monetary value on incomplete performances 34 will prevent the law of
unjust enrichment from affording an adequate remedy in certain cases where
contracts are ineffective due to mistake or error.
One final comment on the defence of failure to make counter-restitution. If the
plaintiff has received nothing from the defendant, then of course the defence
will not be available; there is simply no counter-restitution to be made. 35 In
addition, the defence is unavailable to the defendant if the benefit was one that
he 'ought not to have conferred or ought to have conferred without exacting any
charge or other recompense ...,. This pertains to benefits conferred in
consideration of illegal conduct or benefits conferred as the quidpro quo for
benefits which the defendant had no legal right to exact a price for.3 7
30 id at 417; Goss v. Chilcot [1996] 2 All ER 180.
"' Birks, fn. I at 417-424.
32 ld at 421-423.
33 Id at 415-416.
34 Id at 244-245.
31 Id at 415.
36 Ibid.
31 ld at 423-424.
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When enrichment can be demonstrated, how will its value be
measured?
When the enrichment is in the form of money, problems of valuation will not
arise. On the other hand, where the enrichment consists of goods or services,
a myriad of difficulties and policy considerations come into focus. For
example, take the situation that arises when the plaintiff renders complete
performance under a building contract which is unenforceable for lack of
compliance with statutory formalities. Assume that, as in Pavey & Matthews
Ltd v. Paul,38 performance by the builder will not remove the contract from the
purview of the statute. Assume also that the builder has not received any
portion of the contract price for his or her performance.
This appears to be a simple case of free acceptance or, if you prefer, a
combination of total failure of consideration (unjust factor) and free acceptance
(enrichment). In fact, this is a case where mistake could also be used as an
unjust factor in making out a primafacie case of restitution; specifically, there
is a mistake of fact as to the existence of an enforceable contract.39 Moreover,
there can be no doubt that the enrichment has been 'at the expense'40 of the
plaintiff by virtue of'subtraction.'4 ' Assume further that since the inception of
the unenforceable contract, the market value of the completed structure has
risen substantially.
Assuming that the builder is successful in persuading the court that allowing
restitution will not defeat the policy objectives sought to be achieved by the
statutory formalities,42 what should be the measure of his recovery? There are
two likely possibilities: the builder may recover the current fair market value,
or he or she may be confined to the contract price.43
There is certainly a case to be made that the defendant's liability should be
limited to the price he bargained for under the contract. This amounts to a
subjective approach in which valuation is to be measured from the perspective
38 (1987) 162 CLR 221.
39 Birks, fn. I at 151-152.
40 Id at 132-133.
41 Ibid.
42 See Pavey & Matthews, fn. 38.
43 Arrowsmith, S., 'Ineffective transactions, unjust enrichment and problems of policy'
(1989) 9 Legal Studies, 307-322 ('Arrowsmith').
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of the recipient - what the performance is worth to him or her. When viewed
from this perspective, the value of the plaintiffs performance can easily be
measured in terms of what the defendant was willing to pay under the
contract. 4 There is much practicality in this approach, particularly in light of
the fact that the plaintiff attached a similar value to the performance when he
or she agreed to perform at the contract price.
On the other hand, a cogent argument exists that such an approach leaves the
defendant with a windfall. By limiting the plaintiffs recovery to the contract
ceiling, the defendant is actually getting the benefit of a bargain he or she made
under an unenforceable contract. Equally troubling is the possibility that the
market value may have fallen substantially since the inception of the contract.
If the plaintiff is allowed to recover the contract price, the defendant is made
to suffer the consequences of a bad bargain under an unenforceable contract.
Unless the market has remained stagnant, the parties will reap the benefits and
losses of an unenforceable bargain. Theoretically, it is only in contract law that
the risks of bargaining are allocated in this manner. Thus, in cases where
enforceable contracts are breached, the aggrieved party is generally entitled to
expectation damages that will place him or her in the position he or she would
have enjoyed had the contract been fully performed; that is, he or she is entitled
to the benefit of his or her bargain.
But here, there is no enforceable contract. If that is so, then why should the
measure of restitution be governed by the terms of the contract? Perhaps this
is simply a convenient method of valuation. After all, the agreed upon price is
convincing evidence of the value that each of the parties ascribed to the
performance. This raises the fundamental question of what the goal of the law
of unjust enrichment is or ought to be. If the goal is to restore, as near as
possible, the status quo ante, then it is difficult to reconcile this goal with an
approach that measures valuation from the viewpoint of the recipient. This can
be seen in the example above. If the market price has risen, the defendant will
be in a better position - and the plaintiff in a worse position - than prior to the
formation of the contract. It appears more consonant with restoration of the
status quo ante to measure recovery through an objective standard based on
current market value. This will extract from the recipient no more than the
actual worth of what he or she has received and, at the same time, allow
44 Ibid.
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compensation to the plaintiff commensurate with the present value of his or her
performance. Although this approach will undoubtedly cause hardships, it
avoids the practice of transforming restitution into a mirror image of the risks
allocated under an unenforceable contract.
Arrowsmith would argue in favour of a more flexible approach in which
valuation in ineffective transactions would be influenced by the factors giving
rise to the ineffectiveness. 45 This seemingly benign approach is laden with
difficulties, not the least of which is that it smacks of a comparative fault
approach to valuation. In nearly all transactions which are ineffective as a result
of mistake or error, one or both parties are at fault. If the law of unjust
enrichment is designed to restore the status quo ante, then why should the
relative fault of the parties bring about winners and losers through the process
of valuation on a sliding scale? In addition, applying a comparative fault
approach to valuation would grossly exacerbate the complexities of the law of
unjust enrichment, as though there were not enough already. For example,
would the courts apply principles of negligence and gross negligence? If the
parties are equally negligent, should valuation be done on an objective or
subjective basis? If one party is guilty of negligence and the other guilty of
fraud, how would this affect valuation?
Although none of the aforementioned approaches is entirely satisfactory, I
favour the objective approach because it appears to comport best with what I
have always understood to be the veritable goal of restitution: that of restoring
46the status quo ante. I might add that an objective approach may provide an
incentive for the parties to exercise greater care in protecting themselves from
the consequences of ineffective transactions. The fact remains, however, that
none of these methods of valuation has been universally accepted by the
47
courts. To the extent that subjective valuation leads to results which are
inconsistent with the restoration of the status quo ante, the law of unjust
enrichment fails to provide an adequate remedy in cases where contracts are
ineffective due to mistake or error.
" Ibid.
46 Burrows, A.S., 'Contract, tort and restitution - a satisfactory division or not?' (1983)
99 LQR 217 at 217-239 ('Burrows'); Birks, fn. I at 10, 1I, 15.
47 Arrowsmith, fn. 43.
The efficacy of the law of unjust enrichment where contracts are ineffective 193
Cases where an incapax has been enriched
Another problematic area is that of contracts which are ineffective because one
of the parties lacked the authority or capacity to contract. Contracts entered
into by minors, the mentally disabled, and corporations acting ultra vires fall
under this rubric.
Although the law of unjust enrichment is quite unsettled insofar as transactions
of this type are concerned, 8 it appears to be the general rule that an incapax
who can establish a primafacie case of unjust enrichment can recover against
the other party.49 If it is the incapax who has received the benefit, the general
rule is that he or she is liable in restitution for those enrichments which are
,necessities'; that is, 'those things which the defendant, given his means and
position, could be expected to acquire as a matter of course quite apart from his
incapacity.'50  On the other hand, where the incapax has received a
non-necessary benefit, the prevailing view seems to be that he will not be liable
in restitution. According to Birks, recovery in restitution should be disallowed
in these situations for the very same reasons why the contracts are
unenforceable; there is a lack of legal capacity to request or accept the benefit
and, hence, there is no basis to show a benefit.5' Birks distinguishes these
situations from those in which the incapax is liable for 'necessaries.' In the
latter situations, the 'necessaries' constitute 'incontrovertible benefits' 52 as
anticipated necessary expenditures.'53
Arrowsmith takes issue with Birks' reasoning and argues in favour of
restitutionary claims against an incapax irrespective of whether the benefit
received can be characterised as a 'necessary'. 4 According to Arrowsmith,
Birks' distinction between anticipated necessary expenditures and other forms
of enrichment is highly fictional.55 She argues that the better and more realistic
approach is to determine the issue of enrichment by the same standards that
48 Birks, fn. I at 432.
49 Arrowsmith, fn. 43.
50 Birks, fn. I at 433.
51 Arrowsmith, fn. 43.
52 Birks, fn. I at 116.
13 Idat1]7.
54 Arrowsmith, fn. 43.
" Ibid.
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would be applicable in ordinary transactions.56 If money has been received or
goods or services freely accepted, the fact of enrichment should be conceded
and attention should then focus on the issue of whether restitution should be
permitted as a matter of public policy.57
Addressing herself to this issue, Arrowsmith enunciates several policy
considerations which counsel in favour of permitting recovery. First, she
argues that there is a stronger public policy in reversing unjust enrichment than
in enforcing contracts. Therefore, she argues, Birks is incorrect in his assertion
that the same underlying reasons which make ultra vires contracts
unenforceable should militate against recovery in restitution. While
Arrowsmith cites no authority to support her basic premise, some support can
be found in the fact that restitution is available in many cases where contracts
are unenforceable. Some examples are cases involving illegal contracts where
the parties are not 'in pari delicto,'5 9 contracts void or voidable as a result of
mistake, contracts which are unenforceable for failure to comply with statutory
formalities,60 and even contracts which are ineffective due to lack of capacity.
Arrowsmith finds further fault with Birks' position that the same reasons which
make ultra vires contracts unenforceable should also prohibit recovery in
restitution. Arrowsmith asserts that the major policy consideration underlying
contract enforcement is economic; namely, the 'efficient breach' doctrine which
stands for the proposition that performance should be directed to where it is
most valued. Therefore, breaches that are undertaken for economic gain are to
be encouraged so long as the aggrieved party is compensated in a manner that
will ensure that he receives the benefit of his bargain. 6' Therefore, when the
failure to perform contractual duties is attributable to some other factor such
as an ultra vires act, the 'efficient breach' rationale disappears and thus, there
is no longer a need for enforcement. In the law of unjust enrichment, however,
the 'efficient breach' doctrine is not a relevant consideration. Therefore, while
16 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
5 Birks, fn. I at 424.
'9 Ibid.
60 Idat425.
61 Id at 426.
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an ultra vires act may be a justification for the non-enforcement of a contract,
it is not a justification for denying recovery in restitution.62
Finally, Arrowsmith correctly points out that the notion of ultra vires does not
protect public authorities or private corporations from tort liability. This
represents a policy judgment that the interest in preserving funds for the benefit
of the public at large or corporate shareholders is subordinate to the interest of
compensating the victims of tortious acts.63 Therefore, it is argued, the interest
of reversing unjust enrichment should also be paramount to the interest in
preservation of funds for the benefit of the public or corporate shareholders.
In evaluating the arguments set forth by Birks and Arrowsmith and the general
rule that restitutionary claims against an incapax are disallowed except in the
case of 'necessaries,' the question of whether the law of unjust enrichment
provides a satisfactory remedy is largely in the eyes of the beholder. I agree
with Arrowsmith that Birks' distinction between anticipated necessary
expenditures and other enrichments is too artificial and tenuous to support the
present state of the law. I also agree that the better and more sincere approach
is to apply the normal tests for enrichment and then decide, as a matter of
policy, whether recovery should be permitted. Finally, I agree with
Arrowsmith's conclusion that the laws of contract and unjust enrichment are not
analogous in terms of the legal consequences of ultra vires acts. In terms of the
ultimate policy considerations, I can find no compelling reason to limit
restitutionary claims to 'necessaries' in cases where contracts are ineffective as
a result of incapacity. Where minors are concerned, it is absurd to hide behind
the fiction that even though a benefit has been requested, accepted, or even
used or consumed, it cannot be an enrichment unless it falls within the heading
of 'necessaries.' In modern society, there are no debtors' prisons. If a prima
facie case of unjust enrichment can be made out against a minor, he may well
have the financial means to satisfy a judgment. If he does not, the loss will
then fall on the other party. While minors need protection from themselves and
unscrupulous adults with whom they contract, it is often the unscrupulous
minor who has induced the adult to contract through misrepresentation.
Therefore, the policies underpinning the law of unjust enrichment and the
protection of minors are not well served by an inflexible rule that bars
62 See Pavey & Matthews, fn. 38.
63 Arrowsmith, fn. 43.
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restitution in practically all cases where a minor has contracted. One solution
might be to lower the age of contractual capacity to a more realistic level.
Another might be to allow the courts to deal with this issue on a case by case
basis.
Where public authorities and private corporations are concerned, their fiduciary
responsibilities vis-a-vis the public and shareholders respectively cannot be
discounted. Yet in discharging these responsibilities, they must exercise due
care in avoiding precisely the types of ultra vires acts which lead to ineffective
contracts and restitutionary claims. Though I have already expressed grave
reservations over adopting a comparative fault approach in the law of unjust
enrichment, it is difficult to argue with the fact that in cases such as these, the
fiduciary party is in a better position to know, indeed it has a duty to know,
whether its actions are ultra vires. Further, as a matter of policy, it seems more
equitable to place the risk of loss on the party who is best able to spread the
risk. Though this argument in inapplicable in situations where equally
well-capitalised corporations contract with one another, it has considerable
force in situations where a private consumer or small business contracts with
a public authority or major corporation. Finally, I agree with Arrowsmith that
in any case, the interest in reversing unjust enrichment is stronger than the
interest in preserving funds for the benefit of the public at large or the
shareholders of corporations. It follows, therefore, that this is yet another area
where the law of unjust enrichment does not provide an adequate remedy when
a contract is ineffective due to error or mistake.
Illegality
In contract law, illegal contracts are void and unenforceable. 4 If any of the
contractual duties are illegal, then the entire contract is considered illegal.
Moreover, even if the contractual duties are legal on their face, the entire
contract will be treated as illegal if both parties contemplated that there would
be illegality in its performance.65 If the contractual duties are facially legal and
one party, unbeknown to the other, commits an illegal act during performance,
the law will allow only the innocent party to enforce the contract.
66
64 Ibid.
6' Birks, fn. I at 300-301.
66 Atiyah, fn. 14 at 356-370.
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In cases where contracts are unenforceable due to illegality, the law of unjust
enrichment follows a similar but not identical pattern. Even if the entire
contract is illegal, it is possible that one of the parties may be mistaken as to the
facts giving rise to the illegality. It is also possible that the other party may
have fraudulently induced him or her into believing that the contract was legal.
In cases such as these the law will not consider the parties to be 'in pari
delicto'; that is, the law will not look upon them as equally culpable.67 The
same is true of a party who is aware of the illegality but openly repents before
the illegal plan has reached fruition.68
When the parties are in pari delicto, neither party is permitted to recover in
unjust enrichment.69 In these situations, the courts have adopted the position
that when the parties are both culpable, the defendant will be in the stronger
position.70 The policy of denying recovery to one who is culpable serves two
important objectives. First, it prevents a disgraceful party from invoking the
power of the courts to compel the other party to perform an illegal act.7'
Second, it serves as a deterrent to illegal activity in two ways: first, by denying
the plaintiff recovery, he or she is forced to incur the risk that the party with
whom he or she has contracted may refuse to perform and retain a windfall;
second, the defendant will have less of an incentive to perform the illegal act
if he is aware that the law will allow him or her to retain the benefit regardless
of whether he performs.72 Here, it is difficult to argue with either the policy or
its objectives. In that sense, the law of unjust enrichment does provide an
adequate remedy for an ineffective transaction - none.
When the parties are not in pari delicto, the innocent party may recover in
unjust enrichment, assuming, of course, that he is able to make out a prima
facie case. This result is consonant with the aforementioned policy objectives
and thus, here too the law of unjust enrichment provides an adequate remedy.
A difficult situation arises, however, where the contract is not itself illegal, but
one of the parties violates the law in performing their contractual obligations.73
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Birks, fn. I at 300-301.
70 Id at 301-303.
7' Id at 299-302.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
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Until recently, the prevailing view was to deny recovery to the guilty party or
at least deny it with respect to that portion of his performance that was tainted
by the illegality. 74 The modem trend, however, is to adopt a more flexible
approach which takes into account the type of illegality involved, the policies
sought to be achieved by the law in question, and the penal sanctions that are
to be imposed on the violator.75 If the illegality does not involve moral
turpitude and the sanctions to be imposed are commensurate to the seriousness
of the plaintiffs misdeeds, the trend is to allow recovery unless doing so would
undermine the underlying policy objectives of the statute in question.76
The law of unjust enrichment involves a continual balancing of competing
interests which arise in various contexts. In my opinion, the foregoing
approach strikes a reasonable balance between the need to sanction and deter
illegality and the interest in reversing unjust enrichment. Since the defendant
is not a party to the plaintiffs illegality and does not contemplate illegality in
his own performance, allowing recovery against him could not be used as a
lever to compel the performance of any illegal contractual duties. Similarly,
since the defendant has no illegal obligations to perform, according him
immunity from restitution and a windfall benefit will not provide an incentive
to refrain from violating the law. And if the plaintiffs misdeeds are of the
malum prohibitum species, it may be an overstatement to claim that he is a
disgraceful plaintiff who should not receive assistance from the courts. Indeed,
a denial of recovery may act as a deterrent in some cases, but one must bear in
mind that while ignorance of the law is not a defence, it is often a reality -
especially in a modem society laden with malum prohibitum regulations.
Given this reality, the denial of restitution may have little or no deterrent effect
in many cases. When one factors in the sanctions to be imposed, it appears
that, on balance, a denial of recovery in unjust enrichment would be Draconian.
It must be emphasised that the trend toward a more flexible approach is just
that, a trend. To the extent that courts reject this approach and adhere to the
old hard line, the law of unjust enrichment will not afford an adequate remedy
in ineffective transactions of this type.
3. Conclusion
It is my hope that the foregoing has highlighted some of the key areas in which
the law of unjust enrichment does not afford an adequate remedy where
14 Ibid.
71 See Jamieson v. Watts Trustees, 1950 SC 265.
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contracts prove to be ineffective as a result of mistake or error. As the law of
unjust enrichment progresses through its incipient stages and a more clear and
consistent body of law begins to emerge, I am hopeful that many of these gaps
will be filled. Indeed, at various points in this discussion, I have taken the
liberty of offering what is at least a framework for the resolution of some of
these difficulties.
76 Ibid.

